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Munster: Domestic Relations

DOMESTIC RELATIONS
I.

CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY

Hopkins v. Yarbrough, 284 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1981)
Robinson v. Robinson, 288 S.E.2d 161 (W. Va. 1982)
F.C. v. LV.C., 300 S.E.2d 99 (W. Va. 1982)
In Hopkins v. Yarbrough,' the supreme court held that a circuit court is
without authority to cancel or modify arrearages of a former husband's child
support payments if those payments accrued prior to the date of adoption of
the children by the wife's subsequent husband.2 Citing Rakes v. Ferguson,3 the
court construed the West Virginia Code 4 to allow revisions of child support
decrees pertaining to future installments of payments but not to authorize the
circuit court to alter or cancel accrued installments arising from a prior final
decree. The legal effect of an order of adoption is prescribed in West Virginia
by statute. 5 The statute, however, does not address the question of the former
husband's liability for child support arrearages which accrued prior to the
adoption. The court held, in this case of first impression, that child support
payments vest as they accrue. Therefore, the circuit court was without authority to modify or cancel such accrued installments. The adoption did not effect
the previously accrued arrearages.
Mrs. Hopkins married Mr. Yarbrough, had two children and then received
a divorce by order of the Domestic Relations Court of Cabell County. Pursuant
to that order, Mrs. Hopkins received custody of the children as well as alimony
and child support. Later, Mrs. Hopkins married her present husband and Mr.
Yarbrough was relieved of any further alimony payments. Three years later,
Mrs. Hopkins' current husband adopted the two minor children in Colorado
1 284

S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1981).

2 Id. at 907.

s 147 W. Va. 660, 130 S.E.2d 102 (1963).
W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (1980) provides in part:
[T]he court may also from time to time afterward, on the verified petition of either of
the parties or other proper person having actual or legal custody of such child or children, revise or alter such order concerning the care, custody, education and maintenance
of the children, and make a new order concerning the same, as the circumstances of the
parents or other proper person or persons and the benefit of the children may require.
" W. VA. CODE § 48-4-5 (1980) reads in part:
Upon the entry of such order of adoption, the natural parent or parents, any parent or
parents by any previous legal adoption, and the lineal or collateral kindred of any such
parent or parents, except any such parent who is the husband or wife of the petitioner
for adoption, shall be divested of all legal rights, including the right of inheritance from
or through the adopted child under the statutes of descent and distribution of the State,
and shall be divested of all obligations in respect to the said adopted child, and the said
adopted child shall be free from all legal obligations, including obedience and maintenance, in respect to any such parent or parents. From and after the entry of such order
of adoption, the adopted child shall be, to all intents and for all purposes, the legitimate
issue of the person or persons so adopting him or her and shall be entitled to all the
rights and privileges and subject to all the obligations of a natural child of such adopting
parent or parents.
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where Mr. Yarbrough was present and represented by counsel. Following the
adoption, Mr. Yarbrough failed to pay any of the child support payments that
were in arrears prior to the adoption. Upon Mrs. Hopkins' petition, the circuit
court held that Mrs. Hopkins had forfeited her right to enforce the payment of
child support as a result of the adoption, thereby relieving Mr. Yarbrough from
all obligations to the children including arrearages in child support.0
The supreme court found that the original divorce decree was a final order
that could not be altered except prospectively. Further, a legal adoption eliminates only prospective support of the children but does not eliminate rights
which vested prior to the adoption decree.
In Robinson v. Robinson,7 the court held that where a party has been appropriately served with process and is able to appear, there is no "judicially
cognizable and harmful circumstance sufficient to permit a collateral attack on
an otherwise valid judgment." 8 When the claim of evidentiary insufficiency
arises exclusively from the failure of such a party to appear, the final order
cannot be attacked collaterally on that ground. To the extent that Myers v.
Whiston indicated that alimony and child support orders can be attacked collaterally for evidentiary insufficiency after the eight month appeal period has
run, it is overruled.
Mr. and Mrs. Robinson were divorced by order of the circuit court and
Mrs. Robinson was awarded custody of the children, alimony and child support. Five years later, Mrs. Robinson filed a motion to show cause why Mr.
Robinson should not be found in contempt for failure to comply with the payment of alimony and child support as required in the divorce decree. 10 When
the circuit court held a hearing on the contempt petition, it held that adequate
testimony on Mr. Robinson's ability to pay alimony and child support had not
been taken in conformance with the requirements of the statute1 thus declaring the original order void and obliterating all alimony and child support then
in arrears. The supreme court found that Mr. Robinson was served with process for the divorce hearing and that he did not appear to contest either the
divorce or the payment awards. While the circuit court did not engage in precise inquiry as to Mr. Robinson's financial affairs, there was sufficient evidence
to infer the overall financial condition of the parties.
6 284 S.E.2d at 908.
7 288 S.E.2d 161 (W. Va. 1982).
8 Id. at 162.
238 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1977), overruled, in part, 288 S.E.2d 161 (W. Va. 1982).
10 Initially the circuit judge found that the contempt proceeding was criminal in nature; however, the supreme court, in State ex rel. Robinson v. Michael, 276 S.E.2d 812 (W. Va. 1981), found
that it was not a criminal proceeding. 288 S.E.2d at 162.
1 W. VA. CODE § 48-2-16 (1980) states that:
All judges and courts of this State, called upon to fix, ascertain and determine an
amount as alimony, support or maintenance to be paid by a spouse or to modify any
order pertaining thereto, shall take into consideration, among other things, the financial
needs of the parties, the earnings and earning ability of the husband and wife, the estate,
real and personal, and the extent thereof as well as the income derived therefrom of both
the husband and wife and shall allow, or deny, alimony or maintenance or modify any
former order with relation thereto, in accordance with the principles of justice.
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The supreme court distinguished Myers v. Whiston 1 2 in that Myers was a
habeas corpus proceeding predicated on an original divorce action where the
court had no jurisdiction to award either alimony or child support since Mr.
Myers was a non-resident served by publication. The habeas corpus proceeding
was essentially an appeal brought within the eight months of the circuit court's
final, appealable order. In Robinson, the circuit court order may have been in
error but any error was directly attributable to Robinson's failure to appear.
Additionally, Robinson ignored the order and did not enter an appeal; therefore, the circuit court's order became final and enforceable. Thus, a final alimony and child support order cannot be collaterally attacked for evidentiary
insufficiency after the running of the appeal period.13
The court held in F.C. v. LV.C.'4 that alimony may be awarded against a
faultless party if justice so requires given the financial needs of the parties and
the other factors listed in West Virginia Code § 48-2-16.15
Mr. and Mrs. C. were awarded a no-fault divorce based upon the ground of
having lived separate and apart for more than one year. Mrs. C. alleged that
Mr. C. had twelve to fifteen million dollars in assets, but the circuit court made
no finding about his assets. Mrs. C. worked as a housewife during her marriage
and had previously been empikyed as a beautician and as a dental technician.
The court specifically found no fault by either party.
The supreme court ruled that the circuit court should have analyzed the
financial position of both parties to determine if alimony was required to comport with the principles of justice. In deciding if alimony is expedient, independent of fault, the trial court must utilize the list of factors to be considered as
outlined in § 48-2-16.1" While fault is not listed in the Code section, "consideration may be given to the inequitable conduct of one party"'" in order that the
decision be in accordance with the principles of justice.
II.

CHILD CUSTODY

S.H. v. R.L.H., 289 S.E.2d 186 (W. Va. 1982)

:2

238 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1977), overruled, in part, 288 S.E.2d 161 (W. Va. 1982).

13 Future payments may be altered by a new decree but payments in arrears may not be
cancelled without a showing of fraud or other judicially recognizable circumstances authorizing the
court to set aside the previous decree, as held in Hopkins, 284 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1981).
14 300 S.E.2d 99 (W. Va. 1982).
5 See supra note 11. This construction of § 48-2-16 modifies Dyer v. Tsapis, 249 S.E.2d 509
(W. Va. 1978). The court now construes W. VA. CODE § 48-2-4(a)(7) to find that the award of
alimony need not be based upon fault in divorce proceedings based upon living apart for one year.
In Dyer, the court had ruled that an alimony award was conditional upon a finding of fault. While
West Virginia now has two no-fault grounds for divorce, only subsection (10) on irreconcilable
differences divorces had been held to allow alimony where no fault was found. Haynes v. Haynes,
264 S.E.2d 474 (W. Va. 1980). Dyer has now been modified, by F.C. v. LV.C., to allow no fault
alimony in unilateral proceedings under § 48-2-4(a)(7).
,0See supra note 11.
17 F.C., 300 S.E.2d at 101.
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Taylor v. Taylor, 285 S.E.2d 150 (W. Va. 1981)
In S.H. v. R.L.H. s the court further enunciated the principles for award of
child custody announced in Garska v. McCoy.19 In Garska, the court held that:
Where there is a child under fourteen years of age, but sufficiently mature that
he can intelligently express a voluntary preference for one parent, the trial
judge is entitled to give that preference such weight as circumstances warrant,
and where such child demonstrates a preference for the parent who is not the
primary caretaker, the trial judge is entitled to
conclude that the presumption
20
in favor of the primary caretaker is rebutted.
The court in S.H. v. R.L.H.21 defined "nominate" to mean that a child has the
right to suggest their parental preference and that the court is then obligated
to appoint that guardian unless the court specifically finds such guardian to be
unfit. Also, where one parent has been awarded custody by the court and that
parent 6ither remarries or establishes "a relationship with another adult who is
either a permanent resident or regular overnight visitor, '22 there has been a
sufficient change in the child's circumstances to warrant a re-examination of
the custody order. However, this change of circumstances does not raise any
per se presumption against the continued custody of the original parent.
In this case, the father sought a modification of the original custody order
on the basis that the children had decided that they wanted to live with him.
Their mother had been awarded custody originally and had subsequently remarried. The trial court found that the oldest child, age fourteen, wished to
live with her father and that the two other children, ages thirteen and eleven,
wanted to live with their older sister with whichever parent she chose. The
trial court also found that the oldest daughter desired to live with her father
because she believed that he would be more permissive than her mother in
allowing her to have sexual relations with older men. The father had not been
the primary caretaker for several years and the mother had done an excellent
job in caring for the children. The father was found not to be unfit, but of
23
limited experience in raising children of this age
The supreme court found that under § 44-10-4,24 as construed in Garska,
the father was entitled to custody of the children. While § 44-10-4 does not
is 289 S.E.2d 186 (W. Va. 1982).
9 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).

20 Id. at 358.
21 289 S.E.2d

186 (W. Va. 1982).
Id. at 188.
2:2 Id. at 188.
, W. VA. CODE § 44-10-4 (1982) provides that:
If the minor is above the age of fourteen years, he may in the presence of the county
court, or in writing acknowledged before any officer authorized to take the acknowledgment of a deed, nominate his own guardian, who, if approved by the court, shall be
appointed accordingly; and if the guardian nominated by such minor shall not be appointed by the court, or if the minor shall reside without the State, or if, after being
summoned, he shall neglect to nominate a suitable person, the court may appoint the
2

guardian in the same manner as if the minor were under the age of fourteen years.
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directly apply to custody disputes between parents,25 the statute is used by the
court as evidence of the legislature's intent as to the age at which an adolescent should be given a say in his guardianship. To be consistent, the court
adopted the rule that a child fourteen years of age or older has an absolute
right under the Code to nominate his own guardian. In the absence of a finding
that the nominated guardian is unfit, the court is obligated to appoint said
guardian. To hold a parent unfit, the record must indicate that "a parent is
unreasonably lax in the maintenance of discipline, indifferent to the parental
obligation to give direction and provide control for an adolescent, or follows a
lifestyle that inevitably sets a licentious or immoral example. ' 26 Under the
facts of this case, the court found no indication of such unfitness. Given the
mother's remarriage, allowing for a reexamination of the original custody order, and the children's preference,
the principles of Garska were applied, giv27
ing custody to the father.
In Taylor v. Taylor,28 the court reiterated the primary principle of child
custody awards: the welfare of the child must be the primary consideration
before the court. Although a parent may have unclean hands in obtaining actual custody of the children, the trial court may not reject a modification of
custody petition for that reason alone.
In the original Taylor divorce decree, the father of the children was
granted a divorce on the basis of the wife's adultery and was also awarded
custody of the children. Subsequently, the mother obtained actual custody
with the father's tacit consent. Three years later, the mother petitioned for a
modification of the divorce decree and introduced evidence to show that since
the divorce she had remarried and established a home. Evidence also showed
that the father's home had become less stable and that the children preferred
to live with their mother.
The supreme court ruled that in failing to consider the children's best interests, the trial court committed reversible error, regardless of the mother's
unclean hands. The mother, having shown that her circumstances had changed
and that the change would materially benefit the children, should have been
granted custody.
III. PATERNITY
State ex rel. S.M.B. v. D.A.P., 284 S.E.2d 912 (W. Va. 1981)
The supreme court, in State ex rel. S.M.B. v. D.A.P.,29 held that the three
year limitation of actions to establish paternity is unconstitutional.3 0 While the
25 W. VA. CODE § 44-10-4 (1982) applies to guardianship appointments in lieu of the biological

parents.
26 S.H., 289 S.E.2d at 190.
27 S.H., 289 S.E.2d at 191.
28 285 S.E.2d 150 (W. Va. 1981).
:9 284 S.E.2d 912 (W. Va. 1981).
20 W. VA. CODE § 48-7-1 (1980) limits paternity actions to within three years and this provision has now been declared unconstitutional under the W. VA. CONsT. art. III, §§ 10 and 17.
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United States Supreme Court has not yet held that such statutes are unduly
restrictive under equal protection analysis, the court expressed the opinion
that they were in the belief that the Supreme Court will eventually agree. The
court also found that, under the doctrine of "least intrusive remedy," the statute serves a necessary public purpose with only one unconstitutional element
which is not integral to the statute's full scheme. Therefore, the court struck
only the three year limitation clause as unconstitutional.
. It is a criminal offense for any parent, without lawful excuse, to wilfully
neglect or desert or refuse to provide for the support of his or her child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate.3 1 Yet, under § 48-7-1, an unmarried woman
may accuse any person of being the father of her illegitimate child only within
three years of the child's birth in order to establish paternity as a basis for an
obligation of support. The court decided that a complete bar against illegitimate children from obtaining support, unless a claim has been filed within
three years, creates a classification producing unequal treatment of legitimate
and illegitimate children. 2 This unequal treatment based exclusively upon an
immutable human characteristic does not bear any substantial relationship to
a permissible state interest. The state argued that there was a permissible state
interest in limiting bastardy warrants in order to avoid fraudulent claims
brought after the defendant is unable to adequately prepare his defense. The
court reasoned that since the paternity action has many of the attributes of a
criminal prosecution, the defendant would be adequately safeguarded. s
Thus, the court concluded that the mere passage of time did not work to
the disadvantage of the defendant. Indeed, the court felt that the current statute might actually work to prevent the state goal of support since a woman
might be reluctant to bring an action within three
years if she had any hope of
34
a future married relationship with her mate.
IV.

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

Bryan v. Lincoln, 285 S.E.2d 152 (W. Va. 1981)
In Bryan v. Lincoln,35 the court held that § 56-3-2a 36 does not have application to the duties and rights of parties relative to the transfer of specific
property or money to a betrothed.
In reliance upon an agreement to marry, Bryan borrowed $5,000 and gave
it to Lincoln with the understanding that she would use the money to buy for
31 W. VA. CODE

§ 48-8-1 (1980).

12 284 S.E.2d at 916.
33 Among the attributes cited by the court, in protection of the defendant, were the requirements that paternity be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, court-appointed counsel, and the right
to blood grouping tests at state expense.
-1 284 S.E.2d at 916.
:5 285 S.E.2d 152 (W. Va. 1981).
', W. VA. CODE § 56-3-2a (1982) states that "[N]otwithstanding any other provision of law to
the contrary, no civil action shall lie or be maintained in this State for breach of promise to marry
or for alienation of affections, unless such civil action was instituted prior to the effective date of
this section [March 6, 1969]."
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Bryan her first husband's interest in real estate of which she owned the other
half. Lincoln used the money to buy her first husband's interest but she took
full title. Lincoln then remarried her first husband. Upon Lincoln's refusal to
return any of the-money, Bryan brought a civil suit for the return of the money
or a lien on the real estate. The trial court found that under § 56-3-2a, the
action was barred because no civil action can be maintained for breach of
promise to marry. After reviewing cases from other states with similar statutes,
the supreme court found that the predominate view is that these statutes only
bar actions for damages based upon loss of marriage, humiliation and other
direct consequences of the breach; they do not apply to gifts, the transfer of
property or money rights which are still to be determined according to common-law principles. The court decided that to hold otherwise would be to deprive Bryan of the benefit of Article III, section 17 of the West Virginia Constitution, allowing access to the courts for any injury to person, property or
damaged by
reputation. Thus, to the degree that a property right has been
37
breach of contract, the constitutional provision must prevail.
Catherine Munster

37 The court distinguished Wallace v. Wallace, 155 W. Va. 569, 184 S.E.2d 327 (1971), as an
alienation of affections case involving a minor child. These facts were wholly unrelated and therefore the court did not consider its conclusion, that the statute was constitutional, binding authority
on the case at bar. The court declined to determine the parameters of the constitutional protection
with regard to the statute, beyond the holding that neither prevents a cause of action to recover
property after a breach of contract to marry.
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